Prognosis time: Towards a geopolitics of affect, debility and capacity
Jasbir K. Puar*

Women’s and Gender Studies, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ, USA

This article brings into conversation theories of affect, particularly those emerging from technoscience criticism that foreground bodily capacities for affecting or being affected, for change, evolution, transformation, and movement, and studies of disability and debility which complicate these notions of capacity, even while privileging identity-based rights and representational politics that might reinscribe other forms of normativity. I argue for a deconstruction of what ability and capacity mean, affective and otherwise, and to push for a broader politics of debility that puts duress on the seamless production of abled-bodies in relation to disability. Central to my discussion will be formulations of risk, calculation, prognosis, statistical probability, and population construction, whereby identity is understood not as essence, but as risk coding. Affect is therefore a site of bodily creative discombobulation and resistance but one that is also offered up for increasing monitoring and modulation.

Keywords: affect; disability; debility; capacity; assemblage; queer; neoliberalism; biocapital

...I use the concept of “affect” as a way of talking about that margin of manoeuvrability, the “where we might be able to go and what we might be able to do” in every present situation. I guess “affect” is the word I use for “hope.” One of the reasons it’s such an important concept for me is because it explains why focusing on the next experimental step rather than the big utopian picture isn’t really settling for less. It’s not exactly going for more, either. It’s more like being right where you are – more intensely.

– Brian Massumi, “Navigating Movements”¹

In the above passage, taken from an interview with Mary Zournazi, Brian Massumi develops a notion of “hope” – loosely following Bergson and Spinoza – that is neither an emotion nor a “structure of feeling” (à la Raymond Williams). Instead, Massumi is insistent that affect is something of a residual phenomenon that escapes emotion: the trace effect, as it were, of a recognizable commodity. In other words, he maintains ontological sensation as distinct from the perception of sensation. If affect is impersonal, emotion is the expression or capture of affect, the subjective content and sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of experience which is from that point onward defined as personal.² Hope here is thus deployed as

*Email: jpuar@rci.rutgers.edu
a capacity, emblematic of a futurity that speaks to the body’s tendency to be affected or affecting, its capacity for change, evolution, transformation, and movement. This capacity is likewise the basis for the force of political transformation that does not rely on identity politics or any particular model of social movement, but a different kind of resistance. Stressing that “affect is unqualified,” Massumi avers it is, “not ownable or recognizable and is thus resistant to critique” (2002, 28). His parsing out of affect as a form of capacity is contingent upon his sense that it congeals the body’s unknowable resistance, even as affect has become subject to massive attempts at representational knowability, an epistemological undertaking both driven and marred by a deficit of “cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to affect.” Massumi continues: “Our entire vocabulary has been derived from theories of signification that are still wedded to structure even across irreconcilable differences” (2002, 27). (I want to bracket for a moment the urgent questions, Why affect now? Why this surge of interest in particular genealogies and manifestations of affect such that an “affective turn” – which promotes some genealogies to exclude others – has been hailed?) A notion of hope as affective capacity is deployed slightly differently in the work of Patricia Clough and Sarah Lochlann Jain, who push beyond the singular focus on individual bodies and their relations to other bodies and entities by foregrounding questions of statistical probability in relation to population construction. Clough in particular focuses on what she calls the “biopolitics of an affect economy”: capital machinations that harness bodies and populations to produce quality of life registers in relation to disease, illness, fertility, work productivity, environment, global warming, revealing that affect is less the site of bodily discombobulation and creative resistance, than it is a resource available for surveillance and modulation.

Massumi, for his part, specifically rejects the normative designation of positive and negative affect (because that puts us back in the realm of emotion), suggesting that affect brings with it generative temporality – a biopolitical will that pushes ever forward. Despite his redirection towards ontology – part of longstanding efforts to detoxify fears of biological determinism and to destabilize linguistic reductionism – or, perhaps because of this redirection, Massumi is acutely aware of and not at all dismissive of the fields of the social, the representational, the cultural, the discursive, the epistemological; rather he worries about the dearth of heuristic devices that do not privilege these primary bifurcations in the first place. Encounters with social, cultural, and capitalist infrastructures (literal, built, architectural, ideological, public policy – encounters where bodily capacity may be rendered inadequate or challenged) potentially render affective capacity, in its productive movement, exploitative and exploited. Affective capacity in this sense – that is, a toggling between ontology and epistemology as they cycle in möbius tandem – occupies a steady tension with its opposite, incapacity, or what I will refer to in this essay as “debility.” Thus, the variegated population construction that Jain and Clough key in on draws our attention to the differing and ever-changing sense of hope that Massumi develops in ways that are structural, temporal, and spatial, at once – not embedded in the individuated body, or in a specific sense of bodily capacity. (The democratization of hope as affective capacity for all bodies – one of the main
tenets of the technoscience literature on affect – thus has its limits: who is ultimately included in the designation ‘all bodies?’

In an essay on the temporal dimensions of cancer, Jain argues that “all of us in American risk culture live to some degree in prognosis” (2007, 79). She suggests that “living in prognosis” might be a more helpful articulation of this simultaneous sense of life and death, whereby prognosis may reflect a “measure of hope.” I would say her formulation lends itself to both ontological and epistemological senses of hope. First, as affective futurity hailed as a generative capacity of the human body, even as it is both reflected by and manipulated through relations to statistical probability. Second, in terms of the way hope is rendered in the fantasy of empirical certainty, what Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas call “the political economy of hope” (2005, 439–63), despite the fact that, as Jain reminds us, we either die or do not yet not die, we don’t “70, or 42, or 97 percent die” (2007, 81). In this relation of hope to prognosis, I am indebted to José Esteban Muñoz’s longstanding work on the “politics of hope” as well as Lisa Duggan’s and Muñoz’s collaborative thinking on the subject. As they argue, being able to produce hope modulates punitive distinctions between good and bad neoliberal subjects (for example, a good neoliberal patient is hopeful), even as “hope” remains, in Duggan’s words, “a risk” that must be taken in order to reconfigure the very forms of sociality that produce the dialectic between hope and hopelessness in which we are situated in the first place.5

Again, all these formulations of hope make clear that this capacity is not discretely of the body, that it is always already shaped by and bound to interface with prevailing notions of chance, risk, accident, luck, and probability, as well as with bodily limits – incapacity, disability, and debility.

In my new project, provisionally entitled Debility and Capacity (of which I will here offer a brief, preliminary sketch), I intend to foreground questions of affect as bodily capacity not only in relation to forms of living and dying, but also to debility and disability. Why do these relations between affect, debility, and capacity matter?

In Terrorist Assemblages, I propose a rapprochement of Foucauldian biopolitics and Achille Mbembe’s necropolitical critique of it through what I call a “bio-necro collaboration,” one that conceptually acknowledges biopower’s direct activity to death, while remaining bound to the optimalization of life, and the nonchalance that necropolitics maintains towards death even as it pursues killing as a primary aim. Mbembe’s critique localizes necropolitics, both in temporal terms through slavery and colonization as well as spatial terms – the plantation and the colony and post-colony are his circumscribed “deathworlds.” In this pivotal intervention, he displaces the Holocaust (and Foucault’s focus on Europe) as the dominant trauma of the modern era. Still, Mbembe perhaps places too great an emphasis on the specific sites used to discipline subjects as opposed to more diffuse networks of control, an ironic localization for necropolitics because it once again excuses the investment biopolitics maintains in mapping death in relation to living. Here, I want to deconstruct the bio-necropolitical collaboration much further, using debility and capacity to think about bodies and events that confound attempts to fold easily into and out of the distinctions between living and dying, and to reflect shifting, capacious, porous and contradictory parameters of bio and necro politics.
These are of course older historical questions about the changing contours of what counts as a living body, reanimated by emergent technologies. Surveillance technologies and related bioinformatic economies – DNA encoding and species preservation, stem-cell research, digitization, biometrics, life logging devices, regenerative medical sciences, whose role includes increasing the contact zones and points of interface between bodies, and their subindividual capacities (not to mention related technologies developed to manage the constant amassing of information) – renew all sorts of questions about bodies and their materialities. What is a body in informational terms? Where does a body – and its aliveness – begin and where does it end? If we view information itself as a form of life (or life itself as a compendium of information) we might be led to ask: What is a life? When does it begin and end? And, who owns it? What defines living? In turn, what counts as a death – as dying? Why, as Donna Haraway once asked, should a body end at the skin? (1991).

Kaushik Sunder Rajan favors the formulation “biocapital”: neoliberal circuits of political economy which he argues are generating incipient forms of materiality as well as changing the grammar of “life itself.” New forms of currency – biological material and information – simultaneously produce the materialization of information on the one hand, and a decoupling from its material biological source on the other. As such, we have a constitutive contradiction informing this dialectic between bodily material and information: “information is detached from its biological material originator to the extent that it does have a separate social life, but the ‘knowledge’ provided by the information is constantly relating back to the material biological sample… It is knowledge that is always relating back to the biological material that is the source of the information; but it is also knowledge that can only be obtained, in the first place, through extracting information from the biological material” (Sunder Rajan 2006, 42). If the value of a body is increasingly sought not only in its capacity to labor but in the information that it yields – and if there is no such thing as excess, or excess info, if all information is eventually used or is at least seen as having imminent utility – we might ask whether this is truly a revaluing of otherwise worthless bodies left for dying. If statistical outliers as well as species can live through DNA, what does it mean to be debilitated or extinct? Are all bodies really available for rehabilitation?

I am particularly interested in approaching these questions from the vantage point of queer theory to put duress on assumptions about what queer bodies are, and to see what queer methods obtain once we let go of the discrete organic queer body as its literal referent. I am reminded of a recent comment by Elizabeth Povinelli, who notes that queer theories remain mired in and beholden to “a certain literalism of the referent” of its narrowly constructed proper object. (Which calls forth the following questions: Why do we need a literal referent? How literal is the referent? And then, What is that literal reference?). Queer disability studies has taken up these issues, pushing at the boundedness of bodies, by exploring the ‘mutation’ or deviance of a body that is purportedly whole and organic. While it has generally pursued these questions around the subjectivities and political agendas that are and ought to be produced through the intersections of subject formations like “queer” and “disabled” (that is, queer disabled subjects or disabled queer subjects), these intersections push at the definitional boundaries of each term. In large part, this is...
because these intersections remind us certainly at the very least because they remind us of the historical entanglements that have produced disabled bodies as already queer (both in their bodily debilities and capacities but also in their sexual practices regardless of sexual object choice) as well as queer bodies that are allegedly intrinsically debilitated. As Robert McRuer writes, “despite the fact that homosexuality and disability clearly share a pathologized past... little notice has been taken of the connection between heterosexuality and able-bodied identity”. “Compulsory able-bodiedness” and compulsory heterosexuality are mutually constitutive, argues McRuer. But I would also add, compulsory able-bodiedness is absolutely a prerequisite not only for homonationalist subjects but also for certain exceptional queer subjects, those imbued with a self-proclaimed capacity for transgression, subversion, or resistance.

Further, despite this rich field of inquiry, this domain of scholarship too often remains mired in what Robert McRuer and Nicole Marcotic term “disability culturalism” – a myopic focus on representational politics – along with variants of “barbarism” and “crip nationalism” that reinscribe the centrality of prevailing discourses on race, national identity, gender, and region, producing privileged disabled bodies in distinction to various “others.” Meanwhile, the disability scholarship interested in moving beyond an individual subject that is Euro-American, white, middle-class, and neo-liberal is impoverished. Africanist Julie Livingston, for example, notes that “while four-fifths of the world’s disabled persons live in developing countries, there is a relative dearth of humanities and social science scholarship exploring disability in non-Western contexts” (2006, 125n16).

My intent, then, is twofold: to stretch the perceived contours of material bodies and to infuse queer disability studies with formulations of risk, calculation, prognosis, and statistical probability, whereby identity is understood not as essence, but as risk coding. What happens to congenital disabilities, for example, if they are positioned not merely in ideological terms as pathologies but as informational errors in DNA coding that can be corrected, where the disabled body is productive and not considered to be lacking the capacity for regeneration? This is a very intentional move away from self-other constructs of normality and pathology; instead, I am interested in the way populations are constructed through prevailing ideas of variability and risk. In this move away from normativity and pathology, I wonder how we might view queer and gender non-normative bodies in bio-informatic and statistical terms. How does Jain’s suggestion that we are all “living in prognosis” – that is, living (and dying) in relation to statistical risk, chance, and probability, when populations are assessed based on indices of health, illness, disability, debility, infirmity, disease, fertility, environmental safety, climate change – offer a more dynamic frame for comprehending our multivalent and ever-shifting relations to life and death?

Jain offers, but does not develop, the proposition that “living in prognosis” might be usefully deployed to re-tool disability studies beyond its current imbrication in Euro-American identity-based rights politics, moving us – as she suggests – from the disabled subject to the prognostic subject, from the subject of disability to the subject of prognosis, thus changing the category of disability itself, while temporally...
decomposing the common disability activist mantra: “you’re only able-bodied until you’re disabled.” Prognosis time, then, “severs the idea of a time line,” puts pressure on the assumption of an expected life span – a barometer of one’s modernity – and the privilege one has or does not have to presume what one’s life span will be, hence troubling any common view of life phases, generational time, and longevity. When and how do we stop saying things like, *he died so young* or *she was too young to die?* Jain’s query is instructive in this regard: “If you are going to die at 40, should you be able to get the senior discount at the movie when you’re 35? (Is the discount a reward for long life or for proximity to death?) This relation to time makes death central to life in prognosis, death as an active loss – as if there were some right to a certain lifespan – rather than just something that happens to everybody at the end of life” (2007, 81). Prognosis time should ideally articulate with other theories of queer temporality and social death that work through the unevenness of how populations live and get to live time, from Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s framing of a carceral racism that produces premature death (2007), to Lauren Berlant’s elaboration of the “slow death” malign populations must often bear (2007), to Michael Ralph’s argument about an artistic creativity that “surplus time” engenders in hip-hop artists – that is, time “freed up” by virtue of a prognosis that says you don’t have much time to live, a euphoric release of freedom occasioned by the sense that you have exceeded the dismal prognosis that you will die at an early age (2006).

The political mandate behind such rethinking about disability – or, as I argue, a move from disability to debility – would not be to disavow the crucial political gains enabled by disability activists globally, but to invite a deconstruction of what ability and capacity mean, affective and otherwise, and to push for a broader politics of debility that destabilizes the seamless production of abled-bodies in relation to disability. This entails theorizing not only specific disciplinary sites but also broader techniques of social control, marking a shift in terms from the regulation of normativity (that is, the internalization and regulation of self/other subject formation) to what Foucault calls the regularization of bodies and affect, and what Agamben renders as the difference between regulating to produce order (discipline) and regulating disorder (security) (20 September 2001). This deconstruction therefore shifts slightly from ‘reclaiming’ the singular as well as ordinary capacities of disabled bodies and questioning the enforced normativity produced by abled-bodies, two interventions which disability studies has admirably taken up quite well. Instead, it is about deconstructing the presumed, taken-for-granted capacities-enabled status of abled-bodies. Porously resignifying the categories of disability and debility may aid in addressing what Bryan S. Turner calls “ontological contingency” (2006), eloquently described by Rosemary Garland-Thomson as “the truth of our body’s vulnerability to the randomness of fate.” She continues: “Each one of us ineluctably acquires one or more disabilities – naming them variably as illness, disease, injury, old age, failure, dysfunction, or dependence. This inconvenient truth nudges most of us who think of ourselves as able-bodied toward imagining disability as an uncommon visitation that mostly happens to someone else, as a fate somehow elective rather than inevitable” (2009, 19).
Here, the insights of postcolonial, transnational, and area studies scholars provide pivotal interventions into the field of disability studies. For example, in her work on bodily-impaired miners in Botswana who do not necessarily articulate their plight in relation to disability, Livingston uses the term debility defined broadly to encompass “experiences of chronic illness and senescence, as well as disability per se” (2006, 113). While historically many bodily infirmities “were not regarded as disabilities: indeed they were ‘normal’ and in some cases even expected impairments” (2006, 120), her usage of debility is also demanded because there is a problem with the linguistic deployment of such a predicament in Setswana – there is no word that translates easily to “disability.”

Her research suggests a relation to the necropolitics of debility that is more expansive, foregrounding colonial and postcolonial violence, labor migrations, economic exploitation, and the interventions of western bio-medicine (such that impaired miners are termed “lucky,” in local discourses, because of access to “the most clear cut system for processing newly impaired persons and providing them with tools [wheelchairs, leg braces, and prosthetic limbs] for managing their newly uneven and often arbitrary bodily states” (2006, 111)). Overall, her work prompts an investigation into a disarticulation of “disability” from “disabled subjects” by asking, what does it mean to have a disability but not identify as disabled? Conversely, to identify as disabled without having, in regards to the representational forces of Darstellung and Vertretung, a disability?

As disability is arguably the latest newcomer to the queer intersectional fray – a form of what Rey Chow deems “(post)structuralist (significatory) incarceration” – I want to push Jain further around the formation of a subject of prognosis by problematizing the predominance of subject formation itself, thinking instead of disability and debility in terms of assemblages. The prognostic subject is tethered to what Sunder Rajan calls the patient-in-waiting who is inevitably hailed as a consumer-in-waiting, enabled – literally and conceptually – by the “experimental subject” that is increasingly displaced from conventional forms of manual labor to biocapital regimes where information is extracted from bodily material, often from people of color in/from the global south. As Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell write, “the wealthy can purchase the fantasy of a regenerative body at the expense of the health of other, less valuable bodies” (2006, 187). Neoliberal regimes of biocapital produce the body as never healthy enough, and thus always in a debilitated state in relation to what one’s bodily capacity is imagined to be; aging itself is seen as a debility, as some populations live longer but also live with more chronic illness. Regenerative medicine produces the experience of “double biological time”: as the body ages, the possibility (often unrealistic) of restoring its various parts to at least an originary state proliferates, and a certain promised return to capacity accompanies the experience of aging through debility (Waldby and Mitchell 2006, 125). In fact, being “better than well” emerges as the alibi for the translation of sensation and affect into symptom and thus the rationale for all types of medical intervention, manufacturing the “continual enlargement of the domain of the therapeutic” (Sunder Rajan 2006, 144). (One example of this would be the historical emergence of shyness as a Social Anxiety Disorder, whereby psychotropic drugs
become “personality optimizers.” Another example is the burgeoning field of “cosmetic neurology,” a term used to “describe the practice of using drugs developed for recognized medical conditions to strengthen ordinary cognition,” such as the growing use of Ritalin and Adderall amongst college students and marathon poker players [Talbot 27 April 2009, 35]). Fear of the social – that is, any notion of illness as a form of social unrest or dis-ease – becomes muted through the production of fear of one’s own body. Jackie Orr’s *Panic Diaries*, for example, historicizes the transition from “nuclear panic” to Panic Disorder, from the invocation of the social body to the pathologization of the individuated body that is solely responsible for its health, thus to blame if unable to deal with its own responses (2006). Finally, the neo-liberal consumer subject of health assumes the right not to be injured in the usage of products, even as accidents that derive from product design can annually be predicted with statistical precision, and mapped onto the bodies that are likely to be implicated in these dynamics. Meanwhile, other bodies are employed in the production processes precisely because they are deemed available for injury – they are, in other words, expendable, bodies whose debilitation is required in order to sustain capitalist narratives of progress. The subject of prognosis, then, still proceeds through developmentalist time, still foregrounding an individuated subject in relation to populations.

Out of the numerous possibilities that “assemblage theory” offers, much of it has already begun to transform queer theory, from Elizabeth Grosz’s crucial re-reading of the relations between bodies and prosthetics (which complicates not only the contours of bodies in relation to forms of bodily discharge, but also complicates the relationships to objects, such as cell phones, cars, wheelchairs, and the distinctions between them as capacity-enabling devices) (1994), to Donna Haraway’s cyborgs (1991), to Deleuze and Guattari’s “BwO” (Bodies without Organs – organs, loosely defined, rearranged against the presumed natural ordering of bodily capacity) (1987). I want to close by foregrounding the analytic power of *conviviality* that may further complicate how subjects are positioned, underscoring instead more fluid relations between capacity and debility. Conviviality, unlike notions of resistance, oppositionality, subversion or transgression (facets of queer exceptionalism that unwittingly dovetail with modern narratives of progress in modernity), foregrounds categories such as race, gender, and sexuality as events – as encounters – rather than as entities or attributes of the subject. Surrendering certain notions of revolution, identity politics, and social change – the “big utopian picture” that Massumi complicates in the opening epigraph of this essay – conviviality instead always entails an “experimental step.” Why the destabilization of the subject of identity and a turn to affect matters is because affect – as a bodily matter – makes identity politics both possible and yet impossible. In its conventional usage, conviviality means relating to, occupied with, or fond of feasting, drinking, and good company – to be merry, festive, together at a table, with companions and guests, and hence, to live with. As an attribute and function of assembling, however, conviviality does not lead to a politics of the universal or inclusive common, nor an ethics of individuatedness, rather the futurity enabled through the open materiality of bodies as a Place to Meet. We could usefully invoke Donna
Haraway’s notion of “encounter value” here, a “becoming with” companionate (and I would also add, incompassionate) species, whereby actors are the products of relating, not pre-formed before the encounter (2008, 16). Conviviality is an ethical orientation that rewrites a Levinasian taking up of the ontology of the Other by arguing that there is no absolute self or other, rather bodies that come together and dissipate through intensifications and vulnerabilities, insistently rendering bare the instability of the divisions between capacity-endowed and debility-laden bodies. These encounters are rarely comfortable mergers but rather entail forms of eventness that could potentially unravel oneself but just as quickly be recuperated through a restabilized self, so that the political transformation is invited, as Arun Saldhana writes, through “letting yourself be destabilized by the radical alterity of the other, in seeing his or her difference not as a threat but as a resource to question your own position in the world” (2007, 118). Conviviality is thus open to its own dissolution and self-annihilation and less interested in a mandate to reproduce its terms of creation or sustenance, recognizing that political critique must be open to the possibility that it might disrupt and alter the conditions of its own emergence such that it is no longer needed – an openness to something other than what we might have hoped for. This is my alternative approach to Lee Edelman’s No Future, then, one that is not driven by rejecting the figure of the child as the overdetermined outcome of “reproductive futurism” (2004), but rather complicates the very terms of the regeneration of queer critique itself. Thus the challenge before us is how to craft convivial political praxis that does not demand a continual reinvestment in its form and content, its genesis or its outcome, the literalism of its object nor the direction of its drive.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to José Esteban Muñoz, Patricia Clough, and an anonymous reader for their tremendously helpful feedback on this essay; Michael Ralph for his close reading; audiences at the University of Kent, Emory University, University of California at Irvine and Los Angeles, Trent University, State University of New York (SUNY) Buffalo, University of Minnesota, University of Pennsylvania, York University, and SUNY Stony Brook for their rigorous interrogations; the graduate students in my Debility/Capacity seminar at New York University for pushing through these questions every week; and Amit Rai, Lezlie Frye, and Julie Livingston for numerous conversations over many years. Special thanks to Ann Pellegrini for her insightful readings of my work, her sustained engagement with the emergent project, and her skillful osculating.

Notes on contributor

Professor Puar is Associate Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies at Rutgers University. Her research interests include gender, sexuality, globalization; postcolonial and diaspora studies; South Asian cultural studies; and theories of assemblage and affect. She is the author of Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007), which won the 2007 Cultural Studies Book Award from the Association for Asian American Studies. Professor Puar has also authored numerous articles that appear in Gender, Place, and Culture, Social Text, Radical History Review, Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography, GLQ, and Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. Her edited volumes include a special issue of GLQ titled, “Queer
Tourism: Geographies of Globalization,” and co-edited a volume of Society and Space titled, “Sexuality and Space.”

Notes
1. “Navigating Movements: An Interview with Brian Massumi,” interview by Mary Zournazi (Massumi 2003). This interview offers a succinct overview of Massumi’s theoretical and political commitments.
2. Parables for the Virtual (Massumi 2002, 28, 35). Massumi makes a case for using “affect” and “intensity” fairly interchangeably in his text.
3. See Patricia Clough, Introduction to The Affective Turn (2007); also Ann Pellegrini and Jasbir Puar on “Affect” (forthcoming), for a discussion of Fredric Jameson’s concerns about the “waning of affect” and the demise of the modern subject of politics that he started writing about in 1979. Already at this time Jameson is beginning to schematize distinctions between “intensities” and “feelings” and thus foreshadow these debates between ontology and epistemology. See also Ann Pellegrini’s essay in this volume, which links Jameson’s lament with liberal secular anxieties about the rise of various religious fundamentalisms, thus connecting the affective turn to the emergence of certain public religiosities.
4. For a broader mapping of affective political economies that parallel the periodization of neoliberalism, see Patricia Clough, “Future Matters: Technoscience, Global Politics, and Cultural Criticism” (2004), especially pp. 15–16.
5. “Hope and Hopelessness,” this volume.
7. “Disturbing Sexuality” (Povinelli 2007). This essay is part of a special issue of SAQ titled “After Sex?”
8. “Disabling Sex: Notes for a Crip Theory of Sexuality” (McRuer 2009). McRuer states, “Rarely are disabled people regarded as either desiring subjects or objects of desire” and wonders “what if disability were sexy”? If “having sex” or having certain kinds of sex can already be thought of as privileged bodily capacities, then disability mandates a “rethinking sex” in the field of queer theory. For while queer theory destabilizes what normative sex is through its challenge to heteronormativity, it may well simultaneously normativize certain kinds of queer sex.
9. Crip Theory (McRuer 2006, 1–2). This groundbreaking text is the most synthesized articulation of queer disability studies to date.
12. The Age of the World Target (Chow 2006, 53). For a longer analysis of Chow’s particular exhaustion and frustration with poststructuralist analysis, see the conclusion of Terrorist Assemblages (Puar 2007).
13. See Christopher Lane, Shyness: How Normal Behavior Became a Sickness (2008) for a recent accounting of this process.

References


Talbot, Margaret. 27 April 2009. Brain gain: The underground world of “neuroenhancing” drugs. New Yorker.

