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Mapping US Homonormativities

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Abstract In this paper I argue that the Orientalist invocation of the ‘terrorist’ is one discursive tactic that disaggregates US national gays and queers from racial and sexual ‘others’, foregrounding a collusion between homosexuality and American nationalism that is generated both by national rhetorics of patriotic inclusion and by gay, lesbian, and queer subjects themselves: homo-nationalism. For contemporary forms of US nationalism and patriotism, the production of gay, lesbian and queer bodies is crucial to the deployment of nationalism, insofar as these perverse bodies reiterate heterosexuality as the norm but also because certain domesticated homosexual bodies provide ammunition to reinforce nationalist projects. Mapping forms of US homo-nationalism, vital accomplices to Orientalist terrorist others, is instructive as it alludes to the ‘imaginative geographies’ of the US, as the analytic of race-sexuality provides a crucial yet under-theorized method to think through the imaginative geographies of the US in an age of counter-terrorism. It is through imaginative geographies produced by homo-nationalism, for example, that the contradictions inherent in the idealization of the US as a properly multicultural heteronormative but nevertheless gay-friendly, tolerant, and sexually liberated society can remain in tension. This mapping or geography is imaginative because, despite the unevenness, massively evidenced, of sexual and racial tolerance across varied spaces and topographies of identity in the US, it nonetheless exists as a core belief system about liberal mores defined within and through the boundaries of the US.

Introduction

‘The Empire Strikes Back … So you like skyscrapers, huh, bitch?’ (The legend on posters that appeared in midtown Manhattan, only days after 9/11, depicting a turbaned caricature of Osama bin Laden being anally penetrated by the Empire State building.)

At this historical juncture, the invocation of the terrorist as a queer, non-national, pervasively racialized other has become part of the normative script of the US war on terror. One need only reflect upon the eager proliferation of homophobic-racist images (reactivated from the 1991 Gulf War, the Israel–Palestine conflict, and...

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eighteenth and nineteenth century Orientalist histories) of Osama bin Laden and other terrorists since September 11. Sexual deviancy is linked to the process of discerning, othering, and quarantining terrorist bodies, but these racially and sexually perverse figures also labor in the service of disciplining and normalizing subjects away from these bodies; in other words, to signal and enforce the mandatory terms of patriotism. In this double deployment, the emasculated terrorist is not merely an other, but also a barometer of ab/normality involved in disciplinary apparatuses. Thus the terrorist and the person to be corrected and domesticated—the patriot—are not distant, oppositional entities, but rather, ‘close cousins’ (Puar & Rai, 2002, p.119). What I aim to demonstrate in this article is that through this normativizing apparatus the war on terror has rehabilitated some—clearly not all or most—lesbians, gays, and queers to US national citizenship within a spatial-temporal domain I am invoking as ‘homo-nationalism’, short for ‘homonormative nationalism’. Homonormativity has been theorized by Lisa Duggan as a ‘new neo-liberal sexual politics’ that hinges upon ‘the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption’ (Duggan, 2002, p. 179). Building on her critique of gay subjects embroiled in ‘a politics that does not contest dominant heteronormative forms but upholds and sustains them’, I am deploying the term homo-nationalism to mark arrangements of US sexual exceptionalism—homonormativity—that complicates the dichotomous implications of casting the nation as only supportive and productive of heteronormativity and always repressive and disallowing of homosexuality. I argue that the Orientalist invocation of the ‘terrorist’ is one discursive tactic that disaggregates US national gays and queers from racial and sexual ‘others’, foregrounding a collusion between homosexuality and American nationalism that is generated both by national rhetorics of patriotic inclusion and by gay and queer subjects themselves: homo-nationalism. For contemporary forms of US nationalism and patriotism, the production of gay and queer bodies is crucial to the deployment of nationalism, insofar as these perverse bodies reiterate heterosexuality as the norm but also because certain domesticated homosexual bodies provide ammunition to reinforce nationalist projects. Mapping forms of US homo-nationalism, vital accomplices to Orientalist terrorist others, is instructive as it alludes to the ‘imaginative geographies’ of the US. Derek Gregory, reworking Edward Said’s original framing, describes these geographies as fabrications, ‘combin[ing] “something fictionalized” and “something made real” because they are imaginations given substance’ (Gregory, 2004, p. 17). What I take from this definition of Gregory’s is that certain desired truths become lived as truths, as if they were truths, thus producing all sorts of material traces and evidences of these truths, despite what counter-evidence may exist. In other words, Gregory argues, imaginative geographies are performative: they produce the effect that they name and describe. Importantly, then: first, imaginative geographies endeavor to reconcile otherwise irreconcilable truths; they are mechanisms of, in Freudian terms, disavowal; second the analytic of race-sexuality provides a crucial yet under-theorized method to think through the imaginative geographies of the US in an age of counter-terrorism. It is through imaginative geographies produced by homo-nationalism, for example, that the contradictions inherent in the idealization of the US as a properly multicultural heteronormative but nevertheless gay-friendly, tolerant, and sexually-liberated society can remain in tension. This mapping or geography is imaginative
because, despite the unevenness, massively evidenced, of sexual and racial tolerance across varied spaces and topographies of identity in the US, it nonetheless exists as a core belief system about liberal mores defined within and through the boundaries of the US.

I begin with a survey of the multiple activations of anxious ‘multicultural heteronormativity’ that surfaced after September 11, noting the fissures and disruptions where gay and queer discourses intervene. I then explore multiple sites and genealogies of homo-nationalism, focusing less on conservative LGBTIQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, questioning) discourses, which, though horrifically xenophobic, are hardly surprising and have been well documented. Instead I foreground three less apparent lineages of homo-nationalism: the analyses of terrorist corporealities by feminist, queer, and other scholars; the consumer habits of the gay and lesbian tourism industry, which consciously defines itself as a progressive industry that seeks social change through the disruption of ‘straight space’; and the liberal multicultural discourses of tolerance and diversity portrayed in the cable television cartoon South Park. These three sites, enmeshed in vastly differing homo-nationalisms, suggest both the radical contingency of any nationalist homosexual formation, and the potency of their potential consolidation.

Normativities, Hetero- and Homo-

Heteronormativity is, as it always has been, indispensable to the promotion of an aggressive militarist, masculinist, race- and class-specific nationalism. In the US, the aftermath of September 11 entailed the daily bombardment of reactivated and reverberating (white and multicultural) heteronormative imagery, expectations, and hegemonies. From the images of grieving white widows of corporate executives to the concern about white firemen leaving their families to console widows of former co-workers to the consolidation of national families petitioning for bereavement funds to more recent images of broken military homes, the preservation of white American heteronormative families has been at stake. But events such as the National Day of Mourning (where ‘multicultural’ families gathered together to grieve national loss), the work of numerous national advocacy groups for Arab Americans and Sikh Americans who presented their communities as upright, proper citizens, and the ubiquitous appearance of American flags in immigrant communities, indicates the extent to which normative multiculturalism helped actively produce this renewed nationalism. The narration of post-9/11 sexual practices themselves iterated September 11 as a trauma of national sexual violation, proffering predictions as well as advice about ‘terror sex’. Worried that the ‘nation’s sexual health could spiral’, Judy Kuriansky and other sex therapists discouraged maladaptive behavior, i.e. sex outside of primary, intimate relationships (Richard, 2002, p. 4). Conservative Christian right-wingers such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robinson predictably blamed abortionists, feminists, and gays and lesbians for the September 11 attacks, while George W. Bush strengthened his pro-family agenda through federal programs to fund research and education on ‘healthy marriages’. Same-sex surviving partners petitioning for bereavement funds were initially subjected to plans to have the families of deceased partners account for and validate their relationship, infuriating LGBTIQ advocates.2

However, even as patriotism during the post-9/11 crisis was inextricably tied to a reinvigoration of heterosexual norms for Americans, progressive sexuality was
championed as a hallmark of US modernity. For despite this re-entrenchment of heteronormativity, the US was also portrayed as ‘feminist’ in relation to the Taliban’s treatment of Afghani women and gay-safe in comparison to the ‘Middle East’. While Americans lauded ‘gay heros’ such as Mark Bingham, who diverted one of the hijacked planes, and Father Mychal Judge, a gay New York Fire Department Chaplain who perished in 1 World Trade Center, the New York Times published obituaries of gay victims focusing on their bereaved partners and commemorating their long-term relationships.

Paralleling an uneasy yet urgent folding in of homosexuality into the ‘us’ of the ‘us-versus-them’ nationalist rhetoric, LGBTIQ constituencies took up the patriotic call in various modalities. Gay conservatives such as Andrew Sullivan came out in favor of bombing Afghanistan, and advocated ‘gender patriotism’: butching up and femme-ing down to perform the virility of the American nation, a political posture implying that emasculation is unseemly and unpatriotic. The American flag appeared everywhere in gay spaces: in gay bars, gay gyms, and gay pride; gay pride parades themselves became loaded with national performatives and symbolism—the pledge of allegiance, the singing of the national anthem, and floats dedicated to national unity. (As with the case of communities of color, these flags and other patriotic symbolism may function twofold as defensive and normalizing gestures.) Many gays and queers identified with the national populace as ‘victims of terrorism’ by naming gay and queer-bashing a form of terrorism; some claimed it was imperative to support the war on terrorism in order to ‘liberate’ homosexuals in the Middle East. National LGBTIQ organizations such as the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) and the Human Rights Commission (HRC) had little political reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan. One exception was the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation’s (GLAAD) protest of homophobic graffiti on an army missile (‘High Jack [sic] This Fags’). GLAAD’s press release quotes Executive Director Joan M. Garry: ‘If U.S. military property had been defaced with a racial, ethnic or religious slur against any other group—including against the targeted terrorists—I doubt the Associated Press would have found such a photo acceptable for publication.’

Interesting in this passage is that the epithet ‘fags’ is de-linked from any racist connotations, comprehended only as a homophobic slur. Positive exceptions include the Audre Lorde Project in Brooklyn New York, a community organizing center for lesbian, gay, bisexual, two-spirit, and transgender people of color, which created a nation-wide coalition of anti-war LGBTIQ groups; Al-Fatiha, an international Muslim LGBTIQ group. Many of queer of color groups, mostly located, notably, in major urban locales, reported that immediately after September 11 their lines of solidarity fell towards their respective ‘non-queer’ mainstream racial and immigrant advocacy groups rather than with mainstream queer organizations.

Village Voice Executive Editor and journalist Richard Goldstein claimed that there had been transference of national stigma from one group—queers—to another—Arabs. (In relegating the queer and the Arab to mutually exclusive realms, Goldstein articulates a primary facet of homo-nationalism: that of the whiteness of gay, homosexual and queer bodies, and the attendant presumed heterosexuality of colored bodies.) And, indeed, positive attributes were attached to Mark Bingham’s homosexuality: butch, masculine, rugby-player, white, American, hero, gay patriot, called his mom, i.e. ‘homo-national’; while negative connotations of homosexuality were used to racialize and sexualize Osama
bin Laden: feminized, stateless, dark, perverse, pedophilic, disowned by family, i.e. fag. What is at stake here is not only one is good and the other evil, rather that the homosexuality of Bingham is converted into acceptable patriot values, while the evilness of bin Laden is more fully and efficaciously rendered through associations with sexual excess, failed masculinity (i.e. femininity), and faggotry.

While I have highlighted the most egregious examples of the collusions between homosexuality and US nationalism—gay conservatives such as Andrew Sullivan being the easiest and prime target—I am actually more compelled by ‘progressive’ and liberal discourses of LGBTIQ identity and how they might unwittingly use, rely upon, or reinscribe US nationalisms. The proliferation of queer representation in popular culture (such as *Queer Eye for the Straight Guy* and more recently, *Queer Eye for the Straight Girl*) and the entrance of the queer liberal subject before the law, hailed by the *Lawrence & Garner v. Texas* ruling overturning sodomy laws, makes it less easy to draw delineations between assimilated gay or lesbian identities and ever-so-vigilant-and-resistant queer identities; even the acronym LGBTIQ suggests the collapsing into or the analogizing of multiple identity strands. In homonormative narratives of nation, there is a dual movement: US patriotism momentarily sanctions some homosexualities, often through gendered, racial, and class sanitizing, in order to produce ‘monster-terrorist-fags’ (Puar & Rai, 2002); homosexuals embrace the ‘us-versus-them’ rhetoric of US patriotism and thus align themselves with this racist-homophobic production. Aspects of ‘homosexuality’ have come within the purview of normative patriotism after September 11, incorporating aspects of queer subjectivity into the body of the normalized nation; and, on the other hand, the quarantining of the terrorists through equating them with the bodies and practices of failed heterosexuality, emasculation, and queered others. This dual process of incorporation and quarantining involves the articulation of race with nation. To date much queer theory has contributed to the analysis of the heteronormative constructions of nation as well as of citizenship. M. Jacqui Alexander has written that the ‘nation disallows queerness’ (Alexander, 1994) and V. Spike Petersen locates ‘nationalism as heterosexism’ (Petersen, 1999). While Lauren Berlant and Michael Warner have elaborated upon ‘national heterosexuality’. Yet it is certainly the case that within a national as well as transnational frame, some queers are better than others. While this body of work collectively underscores heteronormativity as a prerequisite for both legal and cultural citizenship, much of it also fails to theorize the class-, race-, and gender-specific dimensions of this heteronormativity; heteronormativity is held as temporally and spatially stable, uninflected, and transparent. An uninterrogated positioning of racial privilege and a single, rather than intersectional, axis of identity is assumed. There are indeed multiple figures of ambivalence, many strangers who trouble and destabilize the nation’s boundaries, suggesting a more complex imaginative geography of the US than what is envisioned with the notion of lesbians and gays as the quintessential strangers of the nation.

Thus, my interest in theorizing US ‘national homosexuality’ or ‘homonationalism’ is to map out the intersections, confluences, and divergences between homosexuality and the nation, national identity and nationalism—the convivial, rather than antagonistic, relations between presumably non-normative sexualities and the nation. If we follow V. Spike Petersen’s theorization of nationalism as heterosexism, in which she situates the nation not only as familial,
but also as fraternal, we see that fraternal nation-state is organized to promote
discourage and prohibit homosexual relations between men. The military is
a prime example of ‘how heterosexist premises underpin hegemonic masculinity.
As a site of celebrated homosocial bonding the military affords men a unique
opportunity to experience intimacy and interdependence with men’ (Petersen,
1999, p. 52). Debatable is her assertion of the sheer uniqueness of this opportunity,
given the preponderance of fraternities, sports teams and events, male-only clubs,
firehouses, the upper echelons of corporate spaces, and so on. And this is an
outdated description of the US military given the large proportion of female
recruits, especially women of color, building the American face of the diverse,
progressive national normativity. But Petersen’s trenchant point remains. If we are
to take seriously the proposition that the nation is at once familial and fraternal,
homosocial fraternal relations exist both to reiterate the centrality of the
heteronormative family and to act as a stopgap preventative measure—a
consolation for the prohibition of homosexual relations. To invert this trajectory,
familial structures of the nation work both to consolidate heterosexuality as
indispensable to national belonging and homosexuality as inimical to it.
Heterosexuality works to secure the uninterrogated, unremarked upon access to
homosocial spaces; through its prohibition of homosexuality, heterosexuality
sanctions homosociality while making homosexuality possible. Thus one could
argue that homosexual desires, and their redirection, are foundational to the
project of nationalism, and nations are heteronormative because of, rather than
despite, homosexuality. Furthermore, theorizations of nationalism and sexuality
need to attend to the multiplicity of the Others of heteronormativity, and in turn
the multiple figures of the Others of homo-nationalism.

As Alexander has demonstrated, ‘heterosexuality is at once necessary to the
state’s ability to constitute and imagine itself, while simultaneously marking a site
of its own instability’ (Alexander, 1997, p. 65). If, according to binaried
sex/gender/desire logic, homosexuality is that which shadows the instability of
the nation’s heterosexuality, then that shadow itself is not constituted outside of
nationhood, rather within it, around it, hovering over it. Through the prescription
of heteronormative stability, or shall I say ‘security’, the matter of the insecure
becomes highlighted: the shadow that is within and outside, the internally
disciplined and the externally quarantined and banished. Turning to Foucault’s
sketch of flourishing sexualities: as a ‘circulating sexuality: a distribution of points
of power, hierarchized and placed opposite to one another’ (Foucault, 1978, p.45),
the shadow is imagined, felt, feared, desired, and in some instances, envisioned, to
effectively function as a threat. Thus while queer bodies may be disallowed, there
is room for the absorption and management of homosexuality—temporally,
historically, and spatially specific—when advantageous for US national interests.
As homonormativity is one of a range of ‘compartmental sexualities that are
tolerated or encouraged’, this management is not consistent and is often only
directed towards certain audiences. As a ‘proximity that serves as surveillance
procedures’ (Foucault, 1978, p.46), homo-nationalism is both disciplined by nation
and its heteronormative underpinnings, and also effectively surveys and disciplines
those sexually perverse bodies that fall outside its purview. Thus the
US nation not only allows for homosexual bodies, but also actually disciplines and
normalizes them—suggesting, in fact, the need to attend to theorizations of the
nation as not only heteronormative, but also homonormative. Reading
non-normative gay, homosexual, and queer bodies through nation, not against it, is to acknowledge that (some) nations are productive of non-normative sexualities, not merely repressive of them. There are at least three deployments of US homonationalism that bolster the nation: 1) it reiterates heterosexuality as the norm (for example, the bid for gay marriage accords an ‘equal but different’ status to queers); 2) it fosters nationalist homosexual positionalities which then police non-nationalist non-normative sexualities; 3) it enables a transnational discourse of US queer exceptionalism vis-à-vis perversely racialized bodies of pathologized nationalities, as the recent violence in Abu Ghraib horrifically lays bare (and also in South Park, which I will discuss later).

Genealogies of Terrorism

One of the most subtle trajectories of homo-nationalism emerges within critical scholarly commentary on the causal links between terrorism and subjectivity. These efforts, launched in part to redress the absence of gender and sexuality in analyses of terrorism and to disrupt dominant narratives about pathology and trauma, nonetheless reproduce some of the very assumptions they seek to dismantle. For instance, remarking on the ‘interesting overlap between pronouncements by career militarists and reductive analyses by pseudoscientists’, Robin Morgan (of Sisterhood is Global fame) (2002, p. 38), notes that ‘the “terrorist psychology” concept is a convenient way of evading complexities, including political ones. Some of its advocates have solemnly announced that terrorists are created by “inadequate or absent mothering” that has resulted in depression, hypochondria, dysphoria, and destructiveness. When in doubt, blame mothers’. While critical of ‘Terrorism Studies’ experts like Jerrold Post, who favor the Western heteronormative nuclear family structure as they zero in on psychic childhood dysfunction, Morgan’s attempts at theorizing the relationships between patriarchy and violence, though feminist in intent, also have reductive tendencies. Morgan’s analysis of patriarchy as the backbone of terrorism, in typical radical feminist fashion, suggests that terrorism functions as sex, what she terms ‘ejaculatory politics’. Unsurprisingly, she borders on advocating lesbianism and a women-centered world as the antidote to terrorism.

Claiming ‘it is in the crucible of all-male intensity that the bonds of terrorist commitment and self-denial are formed’, anthropologist Lionel Tiger offers up the conventional and overstated male-bonding thesis:

> The terrorism of Bin Laden harnesses the chaos of young men, uniting the energies of political ardour and sex in a turbulent fuel. The structure of al-Qaida—an all-male enterprise, of course—appears to involve small groups of relatively young men who maintain strong bonds with each other, bonds whose intensity is dramatized and heightened by the secrecy demanded by their missions and the danger of their projects. (Tiger, 2001)

Tiger foregrounds the prominence of gender-segregated spaces and polygamy in Islamic communities, arguing that these are the fodder for the same-sex intimacy necessary for the intensity of terrorist bonding. Later, however, he avers that bin Laden’s troops ‘have no choice but to accustom themselves to relatively monastic lives’, at once overlooking the possibility of same-sex liaisons while also rendering any homosociality, indeed homosexuality, as mere defaults due to the apparent impossibility of approximating fulfilling heterosexual relations;
according to Joseph Massad, this is a common Orientalist discourse propagated by what he names the ‘Gay International’—gay and lesbian liberationist and missionary NGOs, supplemented by purportedly queer anthropological and ethnographic accounts of Arab male same-sex sexuality (Massad, 2002). The most damning aspect of Tiger’s psychological analysis is its foreclosure of any kind of political, economic or material critique immanent to terrorist motivations. A final quote:

The danger of belonging to [bin Laden’s troops] enhances their excitement and feeds their sense of worthwhile enterprise. Their comrades provide them an emotional haven and a clear focus for the turbulent energies at the intersection of youth and despair. Their basic weapons are intensity and extreme commitment, not the usual visible armament of warriors. (Tiger, 2001)

The emotive effect of Tiger’s piece, presumably intended to stress the psychic and mental desperation of the young men he writes about, only serves to further mock the possibility of politically-motivated (rather than emotional, sexual, theological, irrational, or moral, all excessive and feminized attributes within Tiger’s explanatory devices) dissent.

Zillah Eisenstein reminds us that while narratives of the Taliban’s problematic women-less world abounded, no such failure was ascribed to the ‘very manly moment’ of the post-9/11 white world of rugged firefighters, policemen, ground zero workers, or corporate suits (Eisenstein, 2001, p. 86). While this point is well taken, Eisenstein goes on to quote Ahmed Rashid, writing on the Taliban, who says that ‘most of these men grew up in refugee camps without the love or camaraderie of mothers or sisters’ (Eisenstein, 2002, p. 93). Here we see the over-reliance on a type of heteronormative psychoanalytic explanatory framework of patriarchy that evacuates politics, global capital, even poverty from the range of potential origin narratives. In an inverse move, Ros Petchesky (2001) also claims that the normality of patriarchy is what terrorist networks and the global capitalism of the US have in common. While one claims abnormality, the other normality, both of these ahistorical and aspatial explanations portend amnesia towards the dual presence of same-sex, gender-segregated realms and co-gendered arenas of domestic and public life in the many varied Middle Eastern, Muslim, and Arab contexts.

Sociologist Michael Kimmel also argues that normative gender regimes contribute to the humiliation of damaged psyches: ‘What is relevant is not the possible fact of … Atta’s gayness, but the shame and fear that surround homosexuality in societies that refuse to acknowledge sexual diversity’ (2002, pp. B11–B12), ironic, given that indeed the US is such a society. Claiming that, for the Taliban, terrorism offers the ‘restoration of their masculinity’, class is the focal point of Kimmel’s analysis: ‘central to their political ideology is the recovery of manhood from the emasculating politics of globalization and the westernization of Afghanistan as humiliations’. While Kimmel’s emphasis on processes of gendering rather than sexual object choice is laudable, he conjures globalization as an overwhelming and overarching force that depletes all resistance—with the distinguished exception of retribution:

The terrors of emasculation experienced by lower-middle-class men all over the world will no doubt continue, as they struggle to make a place
for themselves in shrinking economies and inevitably shifting cultures. They may continue to feel a seething resentment against women, whom they perceive as stealing their rightful place at the head of the table, and against the governments that displace them.

Comparing the Taliban to white supremacists in the US, and Mohammed Atta to Timothy McVeigh, Kimmel universalizes the plight of emasculated manhood through essentializing a global hetero-masculine identity and presuming the global hegemony of a normative sex/gender/desire triad, not to mention a crude Marxist version of class affinity. Once again, there is a misreading of gender in Afghanistan as strictly heteronormative, as distinct from a mixture of homosocial and heterosocial milieus; Massad argues ‘efforts to impose a European heterosexual regime on Arab men have succeeded only among the upper classes and the increasingly Westernized middle-classes’ (Massad, 2002, p. 372). The question that must be posed before such comparisons can be proffered is, what constitutes normative gender regimes in Arab contexts? (This, of course, does not even begin to attend to Atta’s time in Germany, nor his upbringing in Cairo, Egypt.) Furthermore, naming fiasco after fiasco of Hitler’s, Atta’s, and McVeigh’s—‘all three failed at their chosen profession’—Kimmel’s analysis insinuates that the inability of entitled men to assimilate themselves into the downwardly mobile economic rescaling of globalization is somehow a malfunction of personal character, thus mirroring the ‘negative identity hypothesis’ of psychological terrorist profiles. Citing Arlie Hochschild on the ‘global masculinity crisis’, this depiction of globalization is also proffered by Barbara Ehrenreich (2001), who otherwise rightly suggests that the linkages between misogyny, masculinity, and terrorism need further probing.8 But like Eisenstein, Ehrenreich’s assessment that gender-segregated spaces are the product of Islamic fundamentalist misogyny (veiling is usually constituted as the most egregious example of oppression by liberal feminists) ignores decades of Muslim feminist work arguing the contrary.9 A final example of this feminist propensity should suffice: ‘long-term warriors have a tendency to see women as a corrupting and debilitating force. Hence, perhaps, the all-male madrassas in Pakistan, where boys as young as six are trained for jihad, far from the potentially softening influence of mothers and sisters. Or recall terrorist Mohamed Atta’s specification, in his will, that no woman handle his corpse or approach his grave’ (Ehrenreich, 2001).

In these allegedly politically progressive efforts, many of them feminist (and all of them secular, I might add), to de-pathologize the individual in favor of contextualizing socialization and the social, the victim status of (always male) terrorist is resurrected, this time not through the failures of the dysfunctional nuclear family but rather through the inescapable brutalities of global capital and heteronormativity. What is gained through these narrative devices? To summarize, through the consideration of gender and sexuality, these explanatory frames and models serve to 1) resurrect feminist constructions of ‘patriarchy’ which homogenize and universalize heteronormative and nuclear familial and sexual relations, inferring that heterosexuality is the same everywhere; 2) posit the causal foci of terrorism within either the individual or within an undifferentiated social milieu—in both cases, the victim or defect model prevails, evacuating and nullifying political critiques and insurgent non-state forms of resistance; 3)
foreclose a serious evaluation of female terrorists by positing a failed masculinity and an investment in patriarchy as compulsory for the growth of terrorism; women are posited as either victims of patriarchy or as emasculating forces vis-à-vis globalization, and sometimes both concomitantly; 4) swerve from, if not avoid altogether, the conundrum of translating gender across geo-political locations, in particular through the erasure of histories of gender-segregated space and a misreading of homosociability as engendered chiefly through the failure to secure ‘proper’ heterosexuality; 5) pre-empt a serious, complicated dialogue about homosexuality in Arab societies that acknowledges the historical and spatial complexities of gender-segregated realms as well as the uneven processes of queer globalization; 6) engender a homo-nationalist production whereby Muslim sexualities are presented as at once homophobic yet perverse, implicitly positing an exceptional US homosexuality that is more advanced in the act-to-identity teleology of sexual modernization.

These stories about the consequences and punishments of non-normative gender and kinship formations—that is, what these ‘Western feminists’ and scholars understand as non-normative—function to circumvent the transnational framings and translations of circuitry and reference points to favor a singular, national, and even cultural frame of appropriate subject-hood. In doing so, these feminist accounts unwittingly dovetail with the most conservative terrorist experts in the field who similarly ascribe myopic, mono-causal, psychological and affective explanations to the phenomenon of terrorist violence, thus privatizing and evacuating the critiques of political economies that the terrorists themselves often articulate.

Spending in the Name of Nation

Another specific genealogy of homo-nationalism can be discerned in the longstanding debate about the relations between gay and lesbian civil liberties and consumer recognition. Janet Jakobsen argues that through the reinvestment of ‘family values’ within the site of the nation, the apparent contradiction between value-free markets and the restrictive, repressive policies of the nation-state can be manipulated to the nation’s benefit (Jakobsen, 2002). (How does the nation benefit? Jakobsen says precisely through the way the family is then reintegrated ‘at a different level into the transnational economy’.)

The market may not care if individuals are gay in the way lawmakers apparently do, but the appeal to market-niche status as site of gay liberation seriously underestimates the intertwining of the value-free with values and of the market and the state. Even apparent conflicts may enact the intertwining of the two. For example, if lesbian and gay politics just turns to the market over and against the dominative values of the state, such efforts will produce the most limited of ‘benefits.’ If family values are simply the site of stability over against flexible capital, then, we would read, for example, the Defense of Marriage Act as a contestation between market and the state, with the state articulating values and the market acting in a value-free manner. Fair enough. But what this reading does not include is the intertwining of the two, the ways these values also work for capitalism, the ways even when incorporated into the state as resistances to ‘diversity’ and
‘transnationalization’ in the economic sector, family values can operate to remake the nation as family that can work in the ‘new world order.’ . . . Conflicts between the state and the market, thus, need to be understood as structured by complicity. (Jakobsen, 2002, p. 60)

We thus do not have an opposition here between civil liberties for LGBTIQ folks and the offerings of the marketplace. That is to say, we are not stuck between the conservative claim that market entry is reflective of social equality and the accusations of assimilation from the queer left. Rather, the nation benefits from the liberalization of the market, one that acts to proffer placebo rights to LGBTIQ consumers who are hailed by capitalism but not by state legislation. Thus, the familial- and kinship-delineating heteronormativity of the nation and the ‘value-free’ homo-nationalism of the market are convivial and complicit rather than oppositional entities. An example of how the nation benefits from homo-nationalism can be found in the history of the gay and lesbian tourism industry. As national identity is reoriented towards excellence in consumption rather than public civic political participation, gay tourists are representative of a form of US exceptionalism expressed through patriotic consumption designed to recover the American nation’s psychic and economic health. Constituting more than 10% or more of the overall US travel industry, the multi-billion dollar gay and lesbian tourist sector is characterized by consumers with high discretionary income, better education, fewer children (and hence more leisure time) and who travel to more international locations than other tourists (and, as opposed to a national average of 29%, 89% of gay and lesbian tourists hold passports).10 As a gay and lesbian marketing firm, Community Marketing has to date generated the most statistical and demographic information about the gay and lesbian tourism industry. Their 2001 survey confirms the high discretionary income of gay and lesbian tourists due to the absence of children and attendant financial responsibilities, claiming that this group is about 50% DINKS (dual income, no kids).11 The report goes on to claim that gay and lesbian travelers, as compared to the national average, travel more frequently and further, spend more money per trip, and have revitalized a flagging cruise industry (20% took a cruise as compared to the national average of 2%).12

In Selling Out: The Lesbian and Gay Movement Goes to Market, Alexandra Chasin states that, ‘advertising to gay men and lesbians has played on ideas about national identity in two significant ways. First, such advertising has often appealed to gays on the basis of their identification as Americans. Second, advertising to gay men and lesbians has often promised that full inclusion in the national community of Americans is available through personal consumption’ (Chasin, 2000, p. 101). Chasin’s astute analysis of the role of US nationalism in the creation and maintenance of the ‘gay and lesbian’ marketing demographic is especially relevant to post-9/11 gay and lesbian tourist consumption practices. Noting that in the early decades of the 1900s advertising in the US was one vehicle for uniting white immigrant submarkets into a ‘single—and American, or at least Americanizable—mass’, Chasin demonstrates that this historical precedent sets up the promise of American belonging through consumption for non-white ethnic immigrants and later, in the early 1990s, for gays and lesbians. Moreover, she argues, since the 1970s, the increasing pressures to create ‘new classes of consumers’ led to the demand for the ‘national’ and the ‘niche’ to co-exist: ‘So at the same time that producers have needed national markets, they have also
needed specialized markets, and it is in this context that “diversity” has become both a social value (however superficially) and an economic imperative (Chasin, 2000, pp. 108–109). This history of Americanization through consumption practices foreshadows the mandate to mark forms of US nationalism and patriotism within the context of the war on terrorism, one that the gay and lesbian tourism industry fully embraced. Immediately after the attacks, Robert Wilson (2001), Executive Director of IGLTA, wrote that: ‘IGLTA headquarters has been rather quiet of late due to the current situation that’s developed from the tragedy of September 11. Members from as far away as Turkey and New Zealand are reporting a rather sharp decline in inquires and new business, with other members advising that they have received many cancellations.’ However these cautionary missives were rapidly replaced by narratives of recovery that contrasted sharply with the overall assessments of the tourism industry at the time:

What a rough time. Your friends at Community Marketing know that you/we are all hurting on many levels: emotional, spiritual and financial. Our best ‘therapy’ is to move ahead, and not let these outside interests paralyze us for too long. I flew on an AA flight Thursday 9/20, and it was good to see more activity, more security, more confidence. (Community Marketing newsletter, October 2001, emphasis added)

For most of us, travel = freedom and we value that right. (Community Marketing e-mail, October 2001)

In positing the events of September 11 as ‘outside interests’, the gay and lesbian tourism industry sought to recuperate itself as distinct and exceptional relative to the broader tourism industry. Disavowing any connection to the political ramifications of the attacks, the idea of therapeutic healing through consumption practices is proffered. Encouragement of patriotic consumption allows participation within the national grieving psyche, and allows for gay and queer subjects to embrace as well as be embraced by the nation. Furthermore, the equation ‘travel = freedom’ references both the notion that travel can function as an escape from heteronormativity and the promotion of US exceptionalism regarding freedom and democracy. Claiming greater opportunities for travel for gay and lesbian consumers, post-9/11 advertising missives stated that unlike the ‘general public’, gay and lesbian travelers planned to take no fewer vacations in the next 12 months as a result of the terrorist attacks. They also predicted a record turnout for the annual International Gay and Lesbian World Travel Expo held in NYC in October 2001. According to an online survey of 446 gay and lesbian travelers conducted two weeks after September 11, 65% planned to take at least three vacations in the coming 12 months, nearly unchanged from the previous 12 months. Nine percent of domestic vacations and 10% of international vacations had been postponed as a result of the attack and the economic downturn, but it was claimed that few gay and lesbian tourists had cancelled their travel plans. Furthermore, the report revealed that among the motivations for choosing destinations, 50% indicated ‘gay-friendly’; 42% ‘more affordable’; and 29% ‘safer’.

Similarly, in an editorial for Passport Magazine, Reed Ide (2001), in response to her research on the impact of September 11 on the gay and lesbian tourism industry, writes: ‘gays and lesbians, in greater numbers than the population at large, will not be driven easily from the values and pleasures they hold dear’.13
Echoing this sentiment, Celso A. Thompson, President of IGLTA (International Gay and Lesbian Travel Association), stated in their November 2001 newsletter:

The terrorist attacks on 9-11 continue to have a devastating impact in the travel industry. Travel agents are losing $50 million dollars per day worldwide. Economists predict a decrease of 1.8% in the American economy and no recovery until the forth quarter of 2002 ... The good news is that gay and lesbian travel is still a leading niche in the travel industry. Tour operators and specialized travel agents experience a different reality to the industry norm. The booking pace seems to be recovering. (Thompson, 2001)

What fuels this rhetoric of queer touristic exceptionalism? And what are the relationships between this exceptionalism and US nationalism and patriotism? Chasin points to the compatibility of US nationalism with a ‘kind of gay nationalism’ through a shared discourse of ‘by our people and for our people’, suggesting a ‘friendly and close, if not identical, relation between the gay community and U.S. national foundations ... enact[ing] the convergence of market and state, reinforcing the equation between citizens and consumers’ (Chasin, 2000, p. 117). In the case of gay and lesbian tourists, the purported demonstration of a commitment to mobility and travel signals far more than merely a set of consumption practices. It also highlights a commitment to US nationalism and patriotism, responding to pleas to revive the psychic and economic health of the US nation devastated by the terrorist attacks, and reiterates a convergence of consumption and politics: you are what you buy, politically speaking. If you are not a terrorist, you are a patriot, as demonstrated by an excellence in consumption; the act of consumption is a statement about one’s political belief in the democratic machinery of the US. Thus the exceptionalism presented in these post-9/11 narratives about gay and lesbian consumption contains not only the gay or lesbian tourist (as interpellated by the gay and lesbian tourism industry) as a consumer par excellence, but also marks this homo-national consumer as an American patriot par excellence.

I turn now to South Park, the popular cable cartoon show (on Comedy Central) directed at adolescents and adults and known for its dark celebration of perversity and excess. Always ridiculing the contradictions of politically-correct liberalism, the show’s satirical storylines regularly produce social and political commentaries about contemporary race, gender, and class politics, through its focus on that which is uncomfortable, uncanny, or shunned. While its audience is clearly international, as demonstrated by the variety of fans conversing about the show in chat rooms and on list-serves, South Park is very much about the mockery of so-called American mores and values. However I am interested in South Park not because of the size or location of its audience nor because of its potential or perceived cultural impact. Rather what intrigues me is the reflection of and continuities with critiques of the war on terror and the pathologization of terrorist bodies that is surfacing in popular culture. Thus South Park itself, as perhaps a minor cultural artifact, may appear superfluous, but the implications of its representational praxis and approaches are not. The ‘trivial’ must be attended to
precisely because marking it as such may mask or obfuscate its deeper cultural relevance. South Park immediately took on the imbrications of non-normative sexualities and perverse and pathological nationalities in the context of September 11. First aired on 7 November 2001, episode number 509, ‘Osama bin Laden has Farty Pants’, had originally been titled ‘Osama bin Laden has a Small Penis’—a title much more to the point. A frenzied plot finds three friends, Cartman (the pudgy boy), Stan (the average American kid) and Kyle (the brainy Jew) held in captivity in Osama bin Laden’s cave in Afghanistan. In one scene Cartman inexplicably pulls bin Laden’s pants down (presumably to thwart him?) only to peer through one magnifying glass after another, for a total of nine, until finally his small penis is discernable. A sign appears: ‘Tiny, ain’t it?’ while Cartman exclaims, ‘So that’s what this is all about?’ Pointing to the popular obsessions with the sexuality of criminality, especially in the tabloid press, Cartman’s observation, as reductive as it may be, mimics/mirrors/isn’t so far off from radical feminist interpretations of contemporary conflict, for example Robin Morgan’s conceptualization of ‘ejaculatory politics’. A more astute reading of the fascination with bin Laden’s small package is offered by Mark Driscoll, who surmises:

Although there are other possible readings, I want to argue that the identification of lack with Osama bin Laden is isomorphic with the inscription of modernization shortcomings in capitalist developmental discourse. That is, the coercion of one single model of development and sociohistorical progress onto the semiperiphery and periphery of the world system consolidated a structure where lack was naturalized for places outside the North. (Driscoll, 2004, p. 72)

The lack in sex signals the lack of modernity; thus the space of the traditional is feeble, flaccid, weak. Later in the episode, Cartman once again tries to distract bin Laden, this time by masquerading as a Muslim woman in a purple chador sitting on a camel. In the display of bin Laden’s dysfunctional heterosexuality—his eyes bugging out, falling on the floor, tongue lolling on the ground, howling like a wild animal—it turns out that he is more interested in fornicating with the camel, which he then proceeds to woo with wine. Now the lack of non-modernity, or perverse modernity, this time figured by the veiled Muslim woman (whose shrouded lack, unlike bin Laden’s, cannot even be seen, but is hidden by the veil) is coupled with Orientalist imagery of animalistic excess and bestiality.

More recently, South Park continues to press against the parameters of national sexualities, fragmenting sexual spaces to such an extent that even queerness, as a critique of identity, cannot account for the multiplicity of contradictions. In the October 2003 much-chattered about ‘South Park is Gay’ episode, the school kids of South Park have jumped on the ‘metrosexual’ fad with a vengeance. Sporting freshly highlighted hair, trendy new clothing, and joshing in the latest lingo about fabrics, fashion, and hygiene, Stan, Cartman, and Kenny deride Kyle for wearing his regular polyester jacket. ‘You gotta get with the times, girlfriend!’ exclaims Stan. Adds Cartman: ‘Yeah, that jacket is so September 10th.’

In this US-based context, metrosexuality, a modality seeped in metro/urban cosmopolitan referents (though in South Park the setting is not urban) that tentatively queers (and to some extent, effeminizes and/or emasculates) straight men, is a symptom of the pervasiveness of homonormativity, in that queerness has already been assimilated into the homonormative. As a marker of that which is
passe´, tedious and tired, September 10 delineates an age of old-fashioned American innocence and ignorance as well as a nostalgia for normalcy. Outdated as well are normative hetero-homo divides. As a ‘contact’ that operates as a ‘inductor’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 46) metrosexuality both caves in to this binary and implode it. Metrosexuality entails contact with queerness and conducts the appropriation of stereotypically queer attributes to heterosexual men. As a response to the age of terrorism, metrosexuality in its American incarnation stages its own form of terrorism, manifested through penetrating and all-encompassing queer aesthetics, even as it capitulates to the regime of homo-nationalism through the dilution of queer politics: queerness is now something spectacular to be had, to covet, rather than reject and revile. In this imaginative geography, the dovetailing of two claims of US exceptionalism—that of superior counterterrorism intelligence and technology and that of the greatest sexual freedom and tolerance—come together in the demarcation of September 10 as part of a prior era. In taking a jab at the glib and facile use of September 11 as a significant moment of change in global history, the scene both displaces this usage—how often is reference made to September 10—but also, through its allusion to an article of clothing, made of polyester no less, the iconic and even traumatic standing of September 11 is mocked. As a counterpart to the age of US new imperialism, metrosexuality triumphantly hails American modernity as the space of sexual exceptionalism, and promotes a union between queerness and patriotism, albeit one that most profitably hails from cosmopolitan city-scapes. Thus, this imaginative geography of the US, privileging a cosmopolitan, urban (metro) formation of sexual laissez-faire, smoothes the cracks and fissures of a highly uneven national terrain of sexual and racial differences across spaces, foregrounding at once the presumed centrality of urban spaces to queer cultures (an urban–rural dichotomy that elides other forms of dissident sexualities that emerge elsewhere) and the desire to repress a metropole-periphery model in favor of a unified singular impression of American tolerance. As a nascent homo-national thread, the metro of metrosexuality suggests that these threads are most readily apparent in cosmopolitan city-scapes.

The rest of the episode features the ‘Fabulous Five’ from Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, a television show that jump-started the metrosexual phenomenon in the United States, radiating out from its European (predominantly British) roots. The boys’ fathers define metrosexuality in various interlocking ways: Skeeter, refuting the charge that he has turned gay, claims, ‘Just because a guy cares about how he looks and is in touch with his feminine side doesn’t mean he’s gay anymore’, Stuart chimes in ‘Yeah. Metrosexual means you’re straight, but you appreciate the gay culture’. ‘It’s super-fabulous’, adds Randy. As the Fab Five metrosexualize everything in their wake, and plans are made for a metrosexual pride parade to combat metrophobia, gay schoolteacher Mr. Garrison, fed up with the selling out of gay culture and identity, calls the metrosexual fad to a halt.

For the most part, these are surface treatments of sexual politics that pale in comparison to one episode in particular. In the midst of a US military build-up towards an imminent invasion of Iraq and massive global anti-war protests, an especially bizarre South Park episode titled ‘The Death Camp of Tolerance’ first aired on November 20 2003. Discovering that he could sue his employers for millions of dollars if fired from his position, Mr. Garrison uses sexual performativity to escalate discomfort and elicit disgust from his fourth grade students. With the introduction of Mr. Slave, the teacher’s assistant or ‘Teacher’s
Ass’ as he is called, Mr. Garrison spanks Mr. Slave while on his way to his seat. Mr. Slave, typifying a leather man, is a large strapping white man with a dark moustache, clad in a pink shirt, blue jeans, black leather chaps, vest and boots, and a police cap. As a leather man, Mr. Slave is not only a gay or queer character, as represented by Mr. Garrison, but rather a figure of sexual transgression and perversity referencing S/M sexual practices, the sexual promiscuity of gay male culture, and its attendant pathologized recreational drug usage. As Mr. Slave sits down, (Eric) Cartman and Craig, two white students in the classroom, confer about Mr. Slave. Cartman, whispering to Craig while glancing around furtively, states, ‘Dude, I think that Mr. Slave guy might be a … Pakistani’.

This significant moment is swift and quickly overridden by a return to the classroom antics of Mr. Garrison and his slave. The comment reflects a curious suturing of racial and sexual difference—the perverse leather man, unrecognized as such by the students, is instead mistaken for another historically salient figure of perversion, the Muslim Other of Orientalist fame. This Other is of course perversely sexualized as well—the Pakistani is recognized through, not against, his sexual excesses, as well as through Mr. Slave’s feminized gender positioning as the recipient of a spanking, and later, of being anally penetrated by a gerbil. If one juxtaposes the queer (leather, S/M) body with the Pakistani (Muslim, fundamentalist, terrorist), body, the commonality of perversion becomes clearer, in that both bodies represent pathological spaces of violence which are constituted as sexually excessive, irrational, and abnormal, taking us back to the figure of the terrorist in Orientalist, public policy, and feminist archives.

One can open up this analysis to the level of geopolitics as well. It is notable that Cartman did not wonder if Mr. Slave was an Afghan or an Iraqi. By naming Mr. Slave as a Pakistani, the show astutely points to an understated complexity in the war on terror—that of the liminal position of the nation of Pakistan. Since September 11, Pakistan’s conundrum has been about the question of its own state-sanctioned and unsanctioned terrorism: caught between US expectations of assistance in reigning in terrorist cells (this assistance rewarded by the lifting of trade sanctions and greater access to IMF loans) and India’s wrath as a supposed victim of Pakistan’s terrorist activities. One could read the referencing of Pakistan as the hailing of the unaddressed terrorist (and, in that sense, it is also a covert acknowledgement of the status of Saudi Arabia as well). More pointedly, the scene alludes to the complicity of the United States and the CIA with the buildup of Pakistan’s terrorist industrial complex: military dictators, opium markets, terrorist training centers set up to fight the Soviets. As Arundhati Roy writes of post-9/11 relations between the US and Pakistan, ‘Now the U.S. government is asking (asking?) Pakistan to garotte the pet it [the US] has hand-reared in its backyard for so many years’ (Roy, 2001). Pakistan, in Roy’s estimation, has been the pilfered bottom to the US’s imperialist topping.

In Leo Bersani’s important article ‘Is the Rectum a Grave?’ Bersani complicates the feminized posture of those receiving anal sex. In its close association with AIDS, Bersani argues, anal sex has come to figure, for heterosexuals, as a destructive self-annihilation, a dark side ascribed to the jouissance of ecstatically-forsaken bodily boundaries during sexual exchange (Bersani, 1987). For the viewer, the ghost of the suicide bomber haunts this queer Pakistani figure. Judith Butler, summarizing Jeff Nunokawa, writes that the male homosexual is ‘always already dying, as one whose desire is a kind of incipient and protracted dying’ (Butler, 1993). But this kind of sex not only kills oneself, but, through the
demolition of the self, also kills others. Butler further elaborates the multiplicity to
death: ‘the male homosexual is figured time and time again as one whose desire is
somehow structured by death, either as the desire to die, or as one whose desire is
inherently punishable by death’ (Butler, 1993, p. 83). Likewise the suicide bomber,
always already dying, is not only consumed with perverted desires of the deaths
of oneself and of others, but also zeroed in on as the exact target of technologies of
death.

Thus, the effeminate and emasculated status of Pakistan, as symbolized
through the anally penetrated Mr. Slave, is signified as a nation that is
decomposing and deteriorating. Cast into the politics of the South Asian diaspora,
Pakistan, through an erasure of the huge number of Muslims in India, represents
the Muslim Other, an association from which normative Hindu Americans and
Sikh Americans must distance themselves. This distancing requires an ever-
narrowing South Asian model minority positioning as it seeks to separate off from
terrorist look-alikes. But, most importantly, Pakistan is used, in the dual
movement of disciplining and quarantining, to separate the nationally sanctioned
space of US queerness, the homonormative Mr. Garrison, from the banished,
perverse, external Muslim Other.

Back to South Park, where the students complain to their parents that Mr.
Garrison and his assistant are ‘totally gay’ and ‘super gay’. The parents chastise
them and immediately take them to the Museum of Tolerance. Inside the Hall of
Stereotypes, the group walks through the Tunnel of Prejudice, where they hear
‘queer, beaner, chink, nigger, heeb, faggot, cracker, slope, jap’. ‘Queer’ and ‘faggot’
are the only non-racial or non-ethnic epithets, equating race with sexuality and
once again producing the white queer as split off from the perverse racial other.
After surveying and challenging a number of stereotypes, they come across the
Arab as terrorist. The Tour Guide promptly says, ‘But of course, we know that all
Arabs aren’t terrorists, don’t we kids?’

The next day in class, Mr. Garrison proceeds to insert the class gerbil,
Lemmiwinks, into Mr. Slave’s anus, after the paddling and gagging of the
hospitalable leather man results in no disciplinary action whatsoever from the
school’s administration. Lemmiwinks disappears in Mr. Slave’s anus; after
encountering a skeleton of another gerbil in Mr. Slave’s lower intestine,
Lemmiwinks turns around only to find Mr. Slave’s anus is now closed. In a
bizarre subplot that tempts even the critical bounds of South Park, Lemmiwinks
embarks on a journey to traverse Mr. Slave’s large intestine in hopes of finding
another opening. A folk song dictates his voyage: ‘Lemmiwinks! Lemmiwinks!
You must escape the gay man’s ass or your tale can not be told.’ Encouraged by the
spirits of the Frog King, the Sparrow Prince, and the Catfish—the remains of other
small animals shoved into Mr. Slave’s anus (called the ‘ass of doom’) —
Lemmiwinks and the three spirits are eventually coughed up by Mr. Slave, and
Lemmiwinks is crowned the Gerbil King. In the meantime, Mr. Garrison’s failed
efforts to get fired land him and Mr. Slave in Tolerance Camp, where they’ve been
sent by the school principal to learn to tolerate their own behavior.

As a team Mr. Garrison and Mr. Slave embody the sliding relationship between
the pyramid structural model of terrorism and the network model. Mr. Garrison
speaks to the civilizational projects at hand: as both the object of tolerance and the
tolerant subject, he disciplines the monstrosity of Mr. Slave even as he
manipulates this monstrosity. Mr. Slave is a convenient conduit or foil for Mr.
Garrison’s own reticent perverse proclivities. We see also that such binary
characterizations are part of the history of sexuality as written by the West. Let us take a look at Foucault’s performative and pedagogical rendering of Orientalism, in the form of the ‘ars erotica’ that he ascribes to ‘the societies’ of China, Japan, India, Rome, the Arabo-Moslem:

In the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a practice and accumulated as experience; pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute law of the permitted and the forbidden, nor by reference to a criterion of utility, but first and foremost in relation to itself; it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated in terms of its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the soul. Moreover, this knowledge must be deflected back into the sexual practice itself, in order to shape it as though from within and amplify its effects. In this way, there is formed a knowledge that must remain secret, not because of an element of infamy that might attach to its object, but because of the need to hold it in the greatest reserve, since, according to tradition, it would lose its effectiveness and its virtue by being divulged. Consequently, the relationship to the master who holds the secret is of paramount importance; only he, working alone, can transmit this art in an esoteric manner and as the culmination of an initiation in which he guides the disciple’s progress with unfailing skill and severity. The effects of this masterful art, which are considerably more generous than the spareness of its prescriptions would lead one to imagine, are said to transfigure the one fortunate enough to receive its privileges: an absolute mastery of the body, a singular bliss, obliviousness to time and limits, the elixir of life, the exile of death and its threats. (Foucault, 1978, pp. 57–58)

As distinct from *ars scientia sexualis*, *ars erotica* signals the perverse modernity (but is it modern?) outside of science, outside of the domestication of sex through the confessional and through the clinical practices of psychoanalysis. Mr. Garrison, through the disclosure of his affinities in his confessional classroom performances, occupies the realm of *ars scientia* as representative of that which can be told. Within Foucault’s act-to-identity telos, one that suggests an incomplete continuum with multiple slippages and ruptures but nonetheless posits temporal progression, the *ars erotica*, embodied here by Mr. Slave, functions as a pre-discursive space of sexual acts, and the return of surges of unrestricted and unregulated desire (one which Foucault contests via a critique of psychoanalysis). In short, as an ‘art of initiation and the masterful secret’ *ars erotica* is not simply outside of, but is opposed to, the knowledge–power configuration of the telling of sex in the Christian West (with the notable exception of Rome) (Foucault, 1978, p. 58).

Thus, the perverse and the primitive collide in the figure of Mr. Slave: the violence of homophobia is shown to be appropriate when directed towards a pathological nationality, while the violence of racism is always already caught in the naming of the queer. The show works to demonstrate the unevenness of liberal forms of diversity tolerance, noting, as Edward Said does in *Orientalism*, that the Arab terrorist is a stereotypical category which nonetheless exceeds the normative boundaries of deconstructing the other. In reading the *ars erotica* through the lens of Said’s *Orientalism*, one deeply attentive to the imaginative geographies of the Orient and the Occident yet myopically resistant to the omnipresent homoerotics of colonialism, we see perversion and primitivity coalesce in the figure of the queer.
terrorist: guided from above, subsumed to the will of a master, death-seeking and
death defying, unable to comprehend rational structures of temporality and space,
drunk with pleasure. Sexuality in *ars erotica* is both pre-discursive and beyond
discourse. The Orient, as interpreted from the Occident, is the space of illicit
sexuality, unbridled excess, and generalized perversion: ‘dangerous sex and
freedom of intercourse’ and afflicted with non-normative corporeal practices (Said,
1979, p. 167). Mr. Slave exemplifies what Foucault names ‘pursued pleasures’—
bodies, practices, and energies both ‘sought after and searched out’—fascinating
pleasures simultaneously abhorred and coveted. Said writes that ‘the Orient was a
place where one could look for sexual experiences unobtainable in Europe’ and
procure ‘a different type of sexuality’ (Said, 1979, p. 190). As a regenerative
discourse—‘the Orient is a form of release, a place of original opportunity’ (Said,
1979, p. 167)—prolific reproduction of the sexual norms of the Occident is made
possible not only through the sexual excesses of the Orient, available through the
travel and conquest of colonialism. Seen as the space of spirituality and sensuality,
the Orient helps the Occident to maintain the rigidity of the rational while partaking
in the secret pleasures of the illicit. As with other processes of colonial extraction
and production, the raw materials of the Orient—in this case the ‘raw novelty’ (Said,
1979, p. 58) of sexual perversion—are imported to sustain the prolific consumption
habits, fertility, and reproduction of the Occident. Foucault also points to the Orient
as a regenerative, stating that the *scientia scientifica* may actually be the *ars erotica*
par excellence. Mr. Garrison extracts a differential value from Mr. Slave to reorganize
his status within his place of employment—as both in opposition to (dichotomy)
and as an extension of (continuum), Mr. Garrison and Mr. Slave work through
complementarity as well as (Derridean) supplementarity. Mr. Slave personifies the
raw materials extracted and imported for Mr. Garrison’s regenerating usage and
ultimate gain. As the queer terrorist, Mr. Slave functions to regenerate the US-based
homo-nationalism of Mr. Garrison.

Closing Thoughts on an Unfolding Scene

In the never-ending displacement of the excesses of perverse sexualities to the
outside, a mythical and politically and historically overstated externality so
fundamental to the imaginative geographies at stake, the (queer) terrorist
regenerates the civilizational missives central to the reproduction of racist
heterosexist and homonormative US nationalisms. Discourses of terrorism are
thus intrinsic to the management not only of race, as is painfully evident through
entrenching modes of racial profiling and hate crime incidents. But just as
significant, and less acknowledged, discourses of terrorism are crucial to the
modulation and surveillance of sexuality, indeed a range of sexualities, within and
outside the US nation’s parameters. I have elaborated upon three threads of homo-
nationalism: feminist scholarly analysis that, despite its progressive political
intent, reproduces the gender–sex non-normativity of Muslim sexuality; gay and
lesbian tourists who perform US exceptionalisms, reanimated via September 11,
embedded in the history of the LGBTIQ consumer-citizen; ‘inclusion’ of gay and
queer subjectivities that are encouraged in liberal discourses of multiculturalism
and diversity but produced through racial and national difference. As reflected by
the debates on gay marriage in the US, these are highly contingent forms of
nationalism and arguably accrue their greatest purchase through transnational
comparative frames rather than debates within domestic realms: sustaining these
contradictions is perhaps the most crucial work of imaginative geographies of nationalism. Produced in tandem with the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005), the demand for patriotic loyalty to the US merely accelerates forms of sexual exceptionalism that have always underpinned homonormativities. Furthermore, there is nothing inherently or intrinsically anti-nation or anti-nationalist about queerness either, despite a critical distancing from gay and lesbian identities. Through the disaggregating registers of race, kinship, and consumption, queerness is also under duress to naturalize itself in relation to citizenship, patriotism, and nationalism. Thus the ‘gains’ achieved for LGBTIQ subjects—media, kinship (gay marriage, adoption), legality (sodomy), consumption (gay and lesbian tourism), must be read within the context of war on terror, the USA PATRIOT Act, the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, and unimpeded US imperialist expansion, as conservative victories at best, if at all.

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Notes

1. I am using the term gay and lesbian in conjunction with queer to demarcate important differences in positionality, yet I also want to suggest that some queers are implicated in homonormative spaces and practices; I feel that the notion of queerness as an identity resistant to gay formations, while historically salient, is less evidenced in the contemporary political climate in the US. In the rest of the text I shorthand gay to include lesbians; I use the term homosexual when it is an appropriate delineation of subject positioning from heterosexual, and the term LGBTIQ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer) to signal organizing, activist and other collective contexts—this acronym however does not include two-spirit identity among other identities. While I adhere to these contextual usages within rotating contexts, invariably there will be slippage. I note the inadequacy of all of these terms, because they are overdetermined and vague, too specific yet too broad. It is precisely the attempt to mediate these tensions that is symptomatic of the problem.
3. Goldstein (2004) notes a similar dynamic taking hold in the presidential elections, particularly with Howard Dean, about whom he asks, ‘Can a Democrat be an alpha male?’
5. I explore these issues of affiliation at length in a forthcoming video on progressive South Asian organizing in New York City.
9. Abu-Lughod (2002), for example, argues that the veil is a form of ‘portable seclusion’ that symbolizes the importance of women’s work in the home. For a discussion on gender, specularity, and veiling, see Berger (1998).
10. In 2001 Community Marketing not only stated that 88% of the market are college graduates (as compared to a national average of 29%), but that an average of 54% took an international vacation last year (45% in 1999), significantly higher than a national average of 9%. Furthermore, the growth in international travel is expected to continue to rise; visits to domestic locations are anticipated to
decrease and trips to the Caribbean and East Asia will increase the most (the greatest increases are projected to be, in order, to South Africa (304% increase), New Zealand (262), Finland (212), Australia (211), and Brazil (172), South Pacific Islands (165)) (Community Marketing, 2001, p. 15). Community Marketing (2001, p. 10) reinforces its conclusions about the ‘Recession-Resistant’ gay and lesbian market by stating: ‘Gay travelers, who hold over three times as many passports as their mainstream counterparts, think nothing extraordinary of going to London for a weekend of theatre, or to a party for a week in Sydney’.

11. For general information on this, see http://www.communitymarketinginc.com.
12. It should be noted that 80% of those surveyed are men and that the demographic information represents those who attend gay and lesbian travel expos and/or read gay magazines such as Curve and The Advocate: ‘It doesn’t represent the whole community, but it does represent where you want your marketing dollars to go’ (Thomas Roth, ‘Welcoming Remarks’, 4 March 2002, IGLTA Annual Conference, Los Angeles).
15. This is a significantly extended reading of an earlier version by Rai & Puar (2004).
16. See also episode #612, where Saddam Hussein is building WMD in heaven, after having a homosexual relationship in hell with Satan, the Prince of Darkness, a storyline begun in the fourth season with episodes #410 and #411.

References

ABSTRACT TRANSLATION

Trazando mapas de Homonormatividades en los Estados Unidos

RESUMEN En este artículo argumento que la invocación Orientalista de la ‘terrorista’ es un táctico discursivo que desagrega los homosexuales estadounidenses de los ‘otros’ raciales y sexuales, y como consecuencia subrayando una colusión entre la homoseksualidad y nacionalismo americano que están producido por retórica nacional de inclusión patriótica y por sujetos lesbiana, gay y queer: homo-nacionalismo. Para formas contemporáneas de nacionalismo y patriotismo americanos, la producción de cuerpos lesbianas, gay y queer es crítica para el despliegue de nacionalismo en cuanto a estos cuerpos perversos reiteran heterosexualidad como la norma y también porque ciertos cuerpos homosexual domesticados proviene municiones para reinformar proyectos nacionalistas. Trazando un mapa de las formas homo-nacionalismo americanos, lo que son cómplices vitales a las otras terroristas Orientales, es instructiva ya que alude a los ‘geografíıás imaginativas’ de los EEUU como el analítico de raza-sexualidad proviene una manera crítica aún bajo de teorizado para pensar en las geografíıás imaginativas de los EEUU en una época de contra-terrorismo. Por ejemplo, a través de las geografíıás imaginativas, lo que están producidos por homo-nacionalismo, se puedan quedar en tensión las contradicciones inherente en la idealización de los EEUU como una sociedad que es apropiadamente multicultural y heteronormativa pero sin embargo gay-amigo, tolerante y libertado sexualmente. Este mapa, o geografía, es imaginativo porque existe sin embargo como una creencia fundamental acerca de las costumbres liberales que son definidos dentro de y a través de las fronteras de los EEUU, a pesar de la desigualdad—evidenciado en profundo—de la tolerancia racial y sexual por espacios variados y topografías de identidades en los EEUU.